How do you solve a problem like Mugabe? Part II

An editorial from the Guardian makes the case that African leaders are hesitant to confront Mugabe not because they are soft on human rights, but because they are committed to the principle of national sovereignty.  

"Modern African and European conceptions of sovereignty are influenced by different historical experiences. The determining historical experience of the former is external conquest, domination and exploitation at the hands of colonial forces. The formative experience of the latter is the second world war, in which untold destruction, along with the Holocaust, instigated grave shock and revulsion in the European psyche."

Aside from generalizing and citing no evidence for actual individual internalization of these "determining historical experiences," this piece is espousing a Eurocentric interpretation of this situation: Africa, not historically blessed with the freedom of the Western world, is reacting to its past, rather than the present situation.  Maybe after they get over it, Africans will achieve the human rights standards of Europe.

Unfortunately, Europe's human rights record is far from perfect.  Or even satisfactory.  Human rights violations in Europe often may take softer forms than the overt violence in Africa--structural discrimination against minorities, social segregation, or since September 11, covert operations, illegal detentions, and surveillance--but they are still violations.  And I am not convinced a real comparison can be made to determine which is worse.  

More likely, there are various reasons why African leaders have chosen to bicker over Mugabe rather than confront him.  Perhaps one of those is a real lack of viable, practical options.  What, in the end, will sanctions against Zimbabwe achieve?  On what terms should the AU unite against Mugabe?  What stake does the rest of Africa have in Zimbabwe's affairs?  These questions should be answered first, before spraying sanctions around.